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IN THE 
SUPR.EME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintif !-Respondent, 
vs. 
GEORGE WILLIAM JACKSON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
11340 
On January 5, 1968, a Comp1aint was filed before the 
City Court of Salt Lake City, charging the Defendanrt, 
George William Jackson wi:fu first degree murder of one 
Willie Henry Watson on January 4, 1968. Thereafter and 
on or about the 29th day of February, 1968, 'the Defendant 
was committed to the Third District Court by Information 
and formally 'accused of the crime of murder in the first 
degree. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
After four days of trial commencing on 1Jhe 2nd day 
of April, 1968, and terminating on the 6th day of April, 
2 
1968, the jury returned a verdict finding the Defendant, 
George William Jackson, guilty of murder in the second 
degree. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
By this appeal, the Defendant-Appellant, George Wil-
liam Jackson, seeks reversal of the conviction and remand 
for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The eye-witness testimony adduced by the State in the 
trial below showed the following: 
1. That several months prior to January 4, 1968, the 
Defendant, a 78 year old man, and the deceased, Willie 
Henry W,atson, also sometimes known as the Reverend 
Watson, had formed a business partnership (Tr. 273-274). 
That the Defendant had been the sole economic contributor 
to the partnership and that the deceased had brought noth-
ing into the union (Tr. 274-277). 'Tihat during the month 
or so prior to January 4, 1968, disputes had arisen between 
Defendant and deceased as to the application of proceeds 
from the partnership by the deceased, (Tr. 277-278), the 
personal conduct of the deceased (Tr. 288-290), and viari-
ous matters relating to the operation of the business (Tr. 
279). That the deceased, several days prior to January 
4, 1968, had informed the Defendant of his intentions to 
dissolve the partnership and force the Defendant to vacate 
the premises empty handed (Tr. 282-284). 
---
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2. That on the 4th day of January, 1968, after having 
been involved in growing dispute, the Defendant purchased 
a hand-gun and returned to ithe business premises late in 
the afternoon (Tr. 292-293). That at or about 5 :30 on the 
afternoon of the 4th, one Ernest Groce, Alvin Johnson, and 
Samuel Ledbetter had come in the &tore for the purpose 
of playing pool (Tr. 275). That at or a:bout that rtime both 
the Defendant and Mr. Watson were on the premises, that 
Mr. Watson had proceeded to the front of the store to sit 
at his desk and that rthe Defendant had .gone back to a 
closet in the rear of the store (Tr. 227). That the Defen-
dant proceeded from the closet at the rear of the store up 
to rthe front of the store while Groce, Johnson, and Led-
better engaged in a conversation and prepared to play pool 
(Tr. 226-227). 
3. That Groce, Johnson, and Ledbetter heard a loud 
noise and turned to observe the Defendant with a pistol in 
hand, firing at the deceased (Tr. 212-213, 227, 238). That 
the Defendant fired five or six shots at the deceased, and 
that the deceased slumped in the chair in whkh he was 
sitting (Tr. 215, 227, 149). 
4. That the Defendant then turned and proceeded 
across the room to his desk where he sat without saying a 
word until the arrival of the Salt Lake City police (Tr. 
227). 
5. Thrut upon the arrival of the Salt Lake City police, 
the Defendant admitted in their presence and in the pres-
ence of several passers-by that he had indeed shot Willie 
Watson (Tr. 138, 143, 198). 
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The Defendant, rtestifying in his own behalf, stated 
that he had killed Willie Watson, but that he did so in self-
defense, the deceased having first puHed a gun on the De-
fendant (Tr. 300-301}. Testimony was adduced on behalf 
of the Defendant showing that the deceased, Willie W artson, 
was a man of violence (Tr. 285-286, 287), that he had 
argued with and had threatened the Defendant (Tr. 280)., 
that he had from time to time carried 2. gun on his person 
(Tr. '284-285), that he had previously made threatening 
gestures toward the Defendant, (Tr. 280), and that the 
Defendant had reason to fear for his safety (Tr. 280). No 
gun belonging to the deceased was ever found (Tr. 185, 
223). 
The testimonial evidence indisputably and rather con-
clusively showed thart on or about the 4th day of January, 
1968, bhe Defendant, George WiHiam Jackson killed Willie 
Henry Watson, (Tr. 212-213, 227, 228); that the Defendant 
intended to inflict bodily harm upon Willie Henry Watson 
by his act (Tr. 300-302); thaJ'c such kiliing was of an un-
lawful nature (Tr. 331); thait said Willie Henry Watson 
died within one year and a day after the cause of death was 
administered, the said acts causing the death having oc-
curred in Sal.t Lake County, State of Utah (Tr. 189-192). 
There remained in balance the questions: Whether the 
killing was done with or without malice or upon a sudden 
quarrel or in the heat of passion and whether and to whwt 
extent the Defendant had acted in self-defense, and the 
evidence was sufficient to carry the jury either way. 
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With its case in such a strong position, the State then 
elected to place irrto evidence, not one, but four photographs 
of the deceased taken from various positions and showing 
various amounts of blood and gore (see E:Jehibits 2, 3, 4, 
and 8). Two of the photographs were color slides reflected 
off a screen for the jury to see (Exhibits 2 and 3). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING 
THE STATE TO PUT MULTIPLE PHOTO-
GRAPHS OF THE DECEASED AT THE TIME 
OF HIS DEATH INTO EVIDENCE AND THE 
DEFENDANT WAS PREJUDICED THEREBY. 
The position of the Defendant on this appeal might 
have been entirely different had the Prosecution, with its 
overwhelming case against the Defendant, elected not to 
place into evidence photographs of the deceased taken at 
the scene of the crime. Nor would the Defendant now be 
able to compl1ain so loudly had the State chosen only to put 
into evidence a single black and white photograph of 
the scene showing items somewhat probative, releviant, 
and necessary to the State's case. This, however, is 
not what the Prosecution elected to do, and it is apparent 
from a ciasmd examinakion of Exhibits 2, 3, 4, and 8 and 
the transcript herein that the prosecutor was not satisfied 
with merely resting a conviction of the Defendant on the 
State's srtrong and conclusive testJimonial evidence. Rather 
the District Attorney was apparently compelled to off er 
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and have received ghoulish photographs of the deceased, 
the real purpose of which was neither probative of any 
issue nor relevant as an aid to the jury, but to inffame, 
anger, and arouse the jury to the point where they would 
inf er malice, pre-meditrution and deliberation on the part 
of the Defendant. 
It was admitted toot the deceased had been moved 
prior to the taking of the pictures (Tr. 158-159). 
Exhibit 8 alone would have been sufficient to illustrate 
for the jury the scene of the crime and the surroundings in 
which it took place, if that had been necessary in light of 
the diagrams and other photographs in evidence (see Ex-
hibits 5, 6, 7, 9, 10 and 11), but without trepidation, the 
Prosecution also offered Exhibit 4 which, even though a 
black and white photograph, grimly portrayed rthe deceased 
as he sat slouched in a chair, drenched in his own blood. 
To cinch the ma!bter, the Prosecution offered Exhibits 2 
and 3, vividly colored slides, which when flashed upon a 
screen before the jury could only provoke horror on their 
part at the scene projected before them - and each scene 
cumulatively showing 1the deceased from only slightly dif-
ferent positions and angles. Even assuming that the pho-
tographs of the deceased were evidence of some element of 
the offense, not otherwise provided by the overwhelming 
testimonial evidence of the State, the photographs were 
cumulative and repetitious and thus calculated only to 
shock and excite the jury. 
It is submitted that these photographs do not iIIus-
trate the depravity of the Defendant's aot; do not give proof 
-
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of malice, pre-meditation or deliberation - the tortured 
body of the deceased would have looked as badly if he had 
been accidentally shot or shot in the heait of passion or 
upon a sudden quarrel; do not prove that the deceased was 
killed or that the Defendant kiUed him - the State had con-
clusive eye-witness testimonial evidence of those facts; do 
not prove that the Deceased died as a result of the wounds 
inflicted upon him, for the StaJte's medical testimony car-
ried this before the jury unrefuted; do not show either 
motive or modus operandi. 
They are only ghoulish portrayals of a man, sitting in 
a chair dripping with his own blood. Never has the State 
gone so far with such repetitiously grisley evidence to prove 
so little. 
This Court has recently discussed the use of such 
photographs in the cases of State vs. Poe, 21 Utah 2d 113, 
441 P. 2d 512, and State vs. Renzo, 21 Utah 2d 205, 443 
P. 2d 392. While the Court reached opposite results in 
each case, it is clear that in the Poe case, the photographs 
had no probative value while in the Renzo case this Court 
determined that the photographs in question, while grue-
some, were otherwise competent and relevant. 
In State vs. Poe, supra, it was clear, and the Court 
found that "All the material facts which conclusively have 
been adduced from a viewing of the slides and been estab-
lished by the uncontradicted lay and medical tstimony" 
515, 441 P. 2d. 
In State vs. Renzo, supra, the majority opinion held 
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that, while it was a matter of discretion with the Trial 
Judge to determine whether the probative value of the pic-
ture in question out-weighed their prejudicial affect, this 
was, nonetheless, the test and was satisfied. 399, 443 P. 2d. 
And Chief Justice Crockett in his concurring opinion, 
stated at 400, 443 P. 2d: 
"The question of admissability of evidence is depen-
dent, among other things, on the issues in dis-
pute and upon which proof is required. In that re-
gard there is a vital difference between the Poe 
case and the instant one. In the Poe case, there was 
no question whatever as to whether the deceased 
was ,shot with intent to kill or as to where or how 
he was shot. The question was whether the Defen-
dant shot him. The facts as to where and how the 
deceased was shot were not only uncontested but 
were amply iHustrated by certain black and white 
pictures taken at the scene ... This lack of probat-
ive purpose, coupled with the fact that there was a 
definite likelihood that they would have the affect 
of suggesting brutality in the crime, and thus pro-
voking resentment and inflaming the passions of 
the jury against the accused, (which likelihood in-
cidentally appears to have been borne out by the 
verdict) , lead us to believe that it was prejudicial 
error to admit the pictures in the Poe case. 
"By way of contrast: In the instant case there was 
a dramaticaHy different situation. The death came 
about as a result of an orgy of drinking and fight-
ing and a great deal of physical violence. There 
were critical questions as to whether there had 
been any attempt to kill, and as to the cause of 
death. On those issues the picture objected to in 
this case were probative as to acts committed by the 
Defendant upon the victim." 
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In this case, there is no question whartever as to 
whether the deceased was shot with an intent to kill or as 
to where and how he was shot. Nor is there any question 
as to whether rthe Defendant short the deceased. The only 
question is as :to the mens rea of the crime. On that question, 
the State's testimonial evidence was more than sufficient to 
support findings on the part of the jury that the Defen-
dant's aot was premedirta:ted and deliberate. On the other 
side, the Defendant's testimonial evidence was sufficient to 
support a finding on the part of the jury that the killing 
was done without malice and upon a sudden quarrel or in 
the heat of passion. W~th the case in thait precarious bal-
ance, the jury should have had the opportunity to make its 
determination without the taint of a series of photographs 
having no relevance or probative value and calculated only 
to arouse their wrath. 
Moreover, the Disrtriot Attorney apparently could not 
withstand the irresistable impulse of utilizing one of the 
colored slides in his closing argument (Tr. 442-443) . And 
for what purpose? To illustrate something which the pho-
tograph itself, upon examination, does not even show, i.e., 
the point of impact of the bullets (Tr. 443). In fact, in 
order for the District Attorney to illustrate the location of 
the entrance wounds, he had to then refer to Exhibit 22, a 
free-hand drawing which lacked any of the gorey and dra-
matic effect and impact that Exhibit 2 necessarily had in 
a closing argument (Tr. 443). 
It is not urged or contended on this appeal that su~h 
photographs as are here involved would not be admissable 
Where their probative value outweighs the danger of preju-
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dice to the Defendant. People vs. Sanchez, 423 P. 2d 800 
(Calif., 1967). Born vs. State, 397 P. 2d 924 (Okla. 1964). 
State vs. Poe, supra. 
But it is urged that they had abso1lutely no probative 
value to any matter in issue and hence there is notthing in 
the balance against which to weigh their prejudicial effect. 
Exhi1Mt 8 was identified as "A photograph ,taken at the 
scene of the victim in the chair." "Which fairly depicts 
Mr. Watson in the position" first observed (Tr. 148). Ex-
hibit No. 3 was "A photograph taken of the scene, also, of 
the victim", which "fairly depicts the victim in the particu-
liar area ... " (Tr. 148). Exhibit 3 was further identified 
as "Another picture of Mr. Watson sitting in his chair" 
(Tr. 154). Exhibit 2 was identified as "Another picture of 
Mr. Watson leaning backwards in his chair with his head 
close to the North wait" It was furither identified as being 
"At a different angle than the previous one you just identi-
fied [Exhibit 3]" (Tr. 155). Exhibit 2 was described as 
"Another photogmph taken to the right of Mr. Watson, 
just at a different angle than ·the previous one" (Tr. 159). 
Exhibit No. 8 was identified as a "Photograph showing Mr. 
Watson behind his desk" which "fairly depicts that particu-
lar area ... " (Tr. 171). 
Again, as to Exhibit 2, the prosecutor corutinued: 
"Q. Now, inviting your attention rto what appears 
to be a swollen area there, can you describe that for 
us as it appeared to you?" 
"A. Yes. There was a small laceration wt about 
this point where you see the bulge on the right side 
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of his temple or right side on the top part of his 
cheek" (Tr. 159). 
There was no further testimony to connect the "small 
lacerwtion" to the cause of death or to identify it further. 
Exhibit 2 was flashed on the screen in front of the 
jury during a description of the bullet wounds, a fadt 
which does not appear from the Exhibit itself (Tr. 160, 
Exhibit 2). Subsequently, precisely the same facts were 
adduced, and apparently in a manner more saitisfactory to 
the District Attorney, by Exhibit 22, a free-hand drawing 
(Tr. 180-184). Exhibit 22 clearly shows the bullet wounds 
- Exhibit 2 shows nothing in that regard. Stated simply, 
the faet is that Exhibit 2 simply did not have sufficient 
probative value in illustrating the bu1'let wounds when 
w~ighed against the danger of prejudice to the Defenjant. 
It is not clear from the transcript for what purpose 
Exhibiits 3, 4, and 8 were offered, but it is clear that they 
added nothing to the proof of the State's case. 
The Defendant submits that when the probative value 
of the photographs does not outweigh danger of prejudice 
to the Defendant, this Court must, as it did in the Poe case, 
reverse and remand for a new trial. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER 
OF LAW IN FAILING TO WEIGH PROBATIVE 
VALUE OF THE PHOTOGRAPHS AGAINST 
THE DANGER OF PREJUDICE TO 
DEFENDANT. 
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At no poinrt Joes it appear in the record that the Court 
below made any effort or attempt to weigh the probative 
value of the subject photographs in resolving any material 
issue as against the danger of prejudice to the Defendant. 
Indeed, the Court did not even indicate for the record the 
basis upon which it received the photogmphs into evidence. 
It is clear from the cases of State vs. Poe, supra, and 
State vs. Renzo, supra, that before such photographs can 
be admitted into evidence before the jury, an inirtia:l de-
termination must be made to determine whether their pro-
bative value with respect to a fact in issue outweighs their 
inflammatory nature. That these photographs totally lacked 
probative value, as now can clearly be seen with the ad-
vantageous aid of a hindsight review of the record, merely 
serves to emphasize the total failure of the Trial Court to 
make its preliminary determination. 
In a case nota:bly similar to the present case, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court held in People vs. Ford, 388 P. 2d 
892, (Calif. 1964), that rthe Trial Court abused its discre-
tion as a matter of law in failing to weigh the probative 
value of photographs of the Deceased against the danger 
of prejudice to the Defendant. Reversing the conviction, 
the Court said at 911, 388, P. 2d: 
"Defendant contends that the Court abused its dis-
cretion in receiving into evidence six photographs 
of the body of the victim ait the scene of the shoot-
ing. It is urged that the photographs are gruesome 
and inflammatory, and that as they are 'essentially 
identical' no more than one should have been ad-
mitted in any event. In the circumstances, we need 
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neither view these photographs nor determine 
whether their admission was prejudicial, for it ap-
pears on the face of the record that the Trial Court 
prima facie abused its discretion as a matter of Law 
in failing to weigh the probative value of the photo-
graphs in resolving a material issue as against the 
danger of prejudice to the Defendant through the 
needless arousal of the passions of the jurors. (Ci-
1Jaitions.) Misapprehension of the law in this respect 
appears to be indicated by rulings on several of the 
challenged photographs : As to one (Ex. 23) the 
Court recognized 'it might tend to be prejudicial' but 
nevertheless ruled that 'as long as it is material 
and shows the deceased after the incident, it is 
material and wiU go in on that basis'; as to another 
(Ex. 24} the Court reiterated, 'Different angle, it 
is material; as long as it is material it can go in.' 
. . . If these photographs are offered on re-trial, it 
will be the duty of the Court to determine their ad-
missability in accordance with the above stated 
rule of Law and to make the fact apparent in the 
record." (Emphasis is the Court's.) 
It is submitted that when this Court wrote the Poe 
decision, it intended that itts holding thereiP- should be 
binding upon Trial Courts in situations where potential'ly 
inflmnmatory photographs were offered into evidence. It 
is further submitted that the Poe decision requires not 
only that Trial Courts exercise sound discretion in this 
area, but that it also places an onus upon the prosecutors to 
exercise some judgment in their zealous and fervent prepa-
ration and presentation to such cases tu the jury. To the 
extent that the Poe case sets up guidelines for the Trial 
Court, it also sets them up for the prosecutors and their 
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flailure to observe those guidelines, particularly in capital 
cases, cannort and should not be lightly absolved. If there 
is any uncertainty in the minds of the Trial Courts or the 
p:riosecutors as to the meaning and affect of the Poe case 
and the Renzo ca:se, and as to the prosecutors there ap-
parently is, such uncertainty shouid be quickly dispelled. 
And surely such uncertainty should not be permitted to 
inure to the detriment of this Defendant whose age, now 
79, makes the distinction between second degree murder 
and V'Oluntary manslaughter of critical import. As stated 
in the Poe case at 515, 441 P. 2d: 
"It could very wel'l be that the jury would have re-
turned the s1ame verdidt absent its view of the slides. 
However, with the Defendant's life is at stake, this 
Court 1should not hazard a guess. The slides could 
very wel'l tipped the scale in favor of the death 
penalty." 
Likewise, the photogr:aphs here could well have tipped the 
scales in favor of a conviction of second degree murder as 
opposed ito a conviction of voluntary manslaughter or an 
acquit1Jal, and the failure of the Trial Court to weigh pro-
bative value against prejudicial effect constitutes revers-
able error. 
POINT III. 
THE FAILURE OF DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL 
AT TRIAL TO OBJECT TO THE ADMISSION 
OF THE PHOTOGRAPHS IS NOT FATAL TO 
DEFENDANT'S APPEAL. 
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It is not disputed that Defendant's counsel in the trial 
below failed to object to the admission of the taintej pho-
'llographs except in one instance, as to Exhibit 4, and as to 
that on the ground that it was "deplicitous", "prt!judicial" 
and "inflammatory" (Tr. 173). Under similar circum-
stances, th:is court said in State vs. Poe, supra, at 515, 441 
P.2d: 
"The counsel for Defendant did not make the proper 
objection to the admission of the slides. However, 
this Court will not all~w such a technicality to in-
fluence its decision in a case such as this." 
If this Court finds, as it Jid in the Poe case, that the pro-
bative value of the photographs in question did not out-
~igh their inflammatory and prejudicial nature, then this 
Court is compelleJ, as it was in the Poe case to reverse and 
remand in spite of insufficient timely objection by counsel. 
That approach in the Poe case, and the utilization of that 
approach here accords with this Court's statement in State 
vs. Cobo, 90 Utah 89, 60 P. 2d 952, wherein at 9'58, 60 P. 
2d it was held: 
"We wish not to depart from the rule laid down in 
this jurisdiction that in ordinary cases on appeal 
errors relating to instructions or refusing requests 
to instruct will not be considered or reviewed uil'less 
exceptions thereto were properly taken by the party 
complaining. Bult in capital cases and in cases of 
grave and serious charged offenses and convictions 
of long terms of imprisonment, cases inV'Olving tJhe 
life and liberty of the citizen, we think that when 
palpable error is made to appear on the face of the 
record and to manifest prejudice of the accused, the 
Court has the power to notice such error and to 
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correct the same, though no formal exception was 
taken to the ruling. In these days of widespread 
advocacy of reformed procedure in criminal cases 
to heal and cure misgivings and faulty prosecutions, 
the safeguards of the rights and privileges of the 
accused should not be overlooked and a loose rein 
held fur the prosecution and a tight, technical, and 
resfric.ted rein helJ on the accused." 
CONCLUSION 
The photographs of the deceased utilized by the Prose-
cution in this ca:se serve no probative purpose. They prove 
nothing that was not indisputably shown by the testimonial 
evidence of the Sta,te. But their lack of probative purpose 
did not render them :ineffectual for the jury that convicted 
Defendant of second degr€€ murder. The prejudicial fail-
ure of the Trial Court to weigh these photographs may well 
have resulted in the impassioned failure of the jurJ bo re-
turn a finding of not guility or guilty of voluntary man-
slaughter. This Defendant earnestly prays that the Court 
exorcise tthe taint of this conviction and remand for new 
tri'al. 
Respectfully submi'bted, 
STEW ART M. HANSON, JR. 
520 Kearns Building 
Sa!lt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Defendant 
--
